Abstract-A code equivalence between index coding and network coding was established, which shows that any index-coding instance can be mapped to a network-coding instance, for which any index code can be translated to a network code with the same decoding-error performance, and vice versa. Also, any networkcoding instance can be mapped to an index-coding instance with a similar code translation. In this paper, we extend the equivalence to secure index coding and secure network coding, where eavesdroppers are present in the networks, and any code construction needs to guarantee security constraints in addition to decoding-error performance.
The equivalence was first shown for linear codes [4] and then for non-linear codes (which include linear codes as a special case) [3] . Furthermore, the equivalence has been shown for any (zero and non-zero) decoding error probability, that is, if the probability of decoding error for the network code is bounded above by a given value, the mapped index code also has this property, and vice versa.
In this paper, we further investigate if the equivalence holds if we impose another constraint besides decodability: security. Separately, the secure version of index coding and that of network coding have been studied, in which additional parties, eavesdroppers, are present, and they attempt to obtain some information on the messages being communicated. More specifically, the secure version of index coding [7] includes a number of eavesdroppers each of whom (i) knows a subset of messages; (ii) listens to the sender's broadcast; and (iii) attempts to decode some messages. The secure version of network coding [8] includes a number of eavesdropper each of whom (i) can listen to a subset of links; and (ii) attempts to decode some messages. A secure index code or a secure network code must prevent eavesdroppers from knowing the messages (where knowing is quantified by the informationtheoretic security measure [9, Ch 22] ), in addition to guaranteeing that all receivers can obtain their requested messages (by bounding the probability of decoding error).
The non-secure equivalence results [3, 4] do not trivially apply to the secure version of the problems. In particular, we pointed out [10] that equating the eavesdropper settings in secure network coding and secure index coding is not straightforward, as the eavesdroppers in the two problems have different characteristics (as described in the previous paragraph). Also, the non-secure equivalence was proven for deterministic code mapping. But randomised encoding is inevitable in some secure network-coding instances [8] , and we have shown [10] that the non-secure equivalence breaks down for randomised encoding.
A. Main Contributions
In this paper, we extend the code equivalence between index and network coding to the secured version. Informally, in Theorem 1, we show that any secure index-coding instance I 1 can be mapped to a secure network-coding instance N 1 , such that any code for I 1 can be translated to a code for N 1 (and vice versa) with the same error decoding and security criteria.
In Theorem 2 and Corollary 2.1, we show that any secure network-coding instance N 2 can be mapped to a secure indexcoding instance I 2 such that 1) any code for N 2 can be translated to a code for I 2 with the same error decoding and security criteria; 2) any code for I 2 a) that has zero decoding error can be translated to code for N 2 with the same error decoding and security criteria, b) that has non-zero decoding error and is linear can be translated to a linear code for N 2 with a security criterion that grows linearly in the codelength, and a decoding criterion that does not grow with the codelength. This implies that that strongly-secure index codes map to weakly-secure network codes. For all cases except 2b, we establish an equivalence that preserves both the decodability and security criteria.
B. Approaches
To obtain the aforementioned results, we utilised the following ingredients:
I.1 a mapping between secure index-coding configurations and secure network-coding configurations, which specifies what each user and eavesdropper has access to and attempt to decode; I.2 a mapping between index codes and network codes; and I.3 analysis of the performance of the mapped index code, in terms of decoding error and security criteria, given the performance of the original network code; and vice versa. For I.1, extending the configuration mapping proposed by Effros et al. [3] , we propose a mapping for the eavesdroppers. Briefly, for each eavesdropper in a index-coding instance, who knows a subset of messages, the corresponding eavesdropper in the network-coding instance will have access to a particular link as well as all the outgoing links from the source nodes of the corresponding messages. In the other direction, for each eavesdropper in a network-coding instance, who has access to a subset of links, the corresponding eavesdropper in the indexcoding instance will have the messages corresponding to the links as side information.
Note that unlike the mapping of the users (the number of users always increase when we map one instance to the other) and the messages (the number of messages always increase from when we map a network-coding instance to an index-coding instance), the number of eavesdroppers in both instances remains the same, and there is a one-to-one correspondence among the eavesdroppers in both problems.
For I.2, we build on the code mapping proposed by Effros et al. [3] . At first sight, this mapping fails when we map a randomised network code to a randomised index code. To rectify this issue, we introduce the concept of an augmented secure network-coding instance to capture the randomness in the encoding. This increases the number of messages in the network-coding instance, but converts all randomised encoding functions to deterministic encoding functions.
For I.3, difficulties arise in obtaining an equivalence for nonzero error and leakage due to the fact that the eavesdroppers in both instances observe different signals: messages for index coding and functions of messages transmitted on links for network coding. If decoding error at the receivers is allowed, these two types of messages do not necessarily match, making it difficult to guarantee the same amount of leakage.
This problem is even more severe for case 2b mentioned in Section I-A, in which we need to select certain parameters for the index code to obtain the required network code, and the parameters must simultaneously satisfy both error and leakage criteria. To obtain the above equivalence result, we use the hypothesis that decoding is correct (1 − ǫ) fraction of the time for I 2 to bound the distance between the probability mass functions (pmf) of the messages in both instances.
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION AND NOTATION
For a strictly ordered set S = {s 1 , s 2 , . . . s |S | }, with a binary relation < where
with node set V and edge set E. For an edge e = (u → v) ∈ E, u, v ∈ V, its tail is tail(e) def = u, and its head is head(e) def = v. For any node v ∈ V, the set of incoming edges is denoted by in(v) def = {e ∈ E : head(e) = v}, and the set of outgoing edges by out(v) def = {e ∈ E : tail(e) = v}. For any positive integer a ∈ Z + , denote [a]
• G = (V, E) is an acyclic directed graph with vertex set V and edge set E. * Each edge e ∈ E is a directed noiseless communication link with a capacity of c e ∈ R + 0 def = [0, ∞) bits per use. This means that if the link is used n ∈ Z + times, vertex tail(e) can send a message X ∈ [2 ⌊c e n⌋ ] to vertex head(e) with no error.
• C = (S, O, D) is the connection requirement. The strictly ordered set S is the collection of source-message indices, where the messages are denoted by {X s : s ∈ S}.
The source-location mapping O : S → V specifies the unique originating node O(s) for source message X s . The destination-location mapping D : S → 2 V specifies the set of nodes D(s) that requires message X s . Note that multiple source messages can originate from a node, multiple destination nodes can demand a particular source message, and a destination node can demand multiple source messages.
• W = ((A r , B r ) : r ∈ R) defines the eavesdropping pattern a set of eavesdroppers indexed by R. Each eavesdropper r ∈ R observes the set of links B r ⊆ E and tries to reconstruct a subset of source messages indexed by A r ⊆ S, i.e., X A r .
We assume that vertices with no incoming links are originating nodes for some source messages, and vertices with no outgoing links are destinations for some source messages. Otherwise, they can be deleted without any consequence.
2) Deterministic network codes: Given (G, C), let the source messages {X s : s ∈ S} be mutually independent, and each message X s be distributed over a finite alphabet X s according to some pmf p X s . A deterministic network code (E, D) consists of a collection of deterministic encoding functions E = {e e : e ∈ E} for the edges, and deterministic decoding functions D = {d u : u ∈ V} for the vertices satisfying the following: Consider n ∈ Z + network uses, meaning that each link is used n times.
• The local encoding function e e for edge e takes in all incoming messages in(tail(e)) to node tail(e) and source messages X O −1 (tail(e)) originating at node tail(e), and outputs a random variable associated with link e, denoted by X e ∈ [2 ⌊c e n⌋ ].
Given that G is acyclic, each edge message X e can be written as a function of source messages originating from its predecessors, denoted by g e . This is known as the global encoding function, and it can be recursively calculated (following the topology of the graph) using (i) g e = e e (X O −1 (tail(e)) ) if tail(e) has no incoming links, and (ii) g e = e e (g in(tail(e)) , X O −1 (tail(e)) ). So, in general, we write g e (X S ) for all e ∈ E.
• The decoding function d u for a node u ∈ V takes in random variables associated with links in(u) and source messages originating at node u, and outputs an estimate of X {s ∈S:u ∈D(s)} , denoted by X (u) {s ∈S:u ∈D(s)} .
Let the probability of the event that one or more destination nodes make a decoding error be denoted as P e = Pr{X (u) {s ∈S:u ∈D(s)} X {s ∈S:u ∈D(s)} for at least one destination node u}.
(
For some ǫ ∈ R + 0 , a network code (E, D) said to have at most ǫ error if and only if P e ≤ ǫ.
When η = 0, we say that the code allows perfect decoding.
3) Randomised network codes:
A network code is said to be randomised if there exists an edge function e e that is not a deterministic function of the random variables associated with in(tail(e)) and source messages originating at node tail(e).
Any randomised network code can be implemented by an equivalent deterministic network code by generating an independent random variable Z u at each node u ∈ V, and defining a deterministic map from X in(tail(e)) , X O −1 (tail(e)) , and Z tail(e) to X e for each edge e ∈ E [11] . These random variables {Z u : u ∈ V} are assumed to be mutually independent, and are often referred to as random keys.
A randomised network code (E ′ , D) is similar to a deterministic network code (E, D), except that each edge encoding function e ′ e is a deterministic function of (i) random variables associated with in(tail(e)), (ii) source messages originating at node tail(e), and (iii) the random key Z tail(e) . 4) Secure network codes: A deterministic or randomised network code (E, D) for (G, M) is said to be secure against an eavesdropping pattern W if each eavesdropper r gains not more than a specific amount of information about X A r that it attempts to reconstruct after observing X B r on the links it has access to. Formally, the information leakage to eavesdropper r is calculated as I(X A r ; X B r ).
For some η ∈ R + 0 , a network code is said to be have at most η leakage if and only if
When η = 0, we say that the code is perfectly secure.
5) Secure network-coding feasibility:
A secure networkcoding instance N is said to be (S * , (p X s : s ∈ S * ), ǫ, η, n)-feasible if and only if there exists a joint pmf p X S\S * = s ∈S\S * p X s for messages X S\S * and a secure network code over n network uses with at most ǫ error and η leakage for the message joint pmf p X S (x S ) = p X S * (x S * )p X S\S * (x S\S * ).
Note that our message setup is sufficiently general, which include the problem formulations: F.1 Given a joint message pmf p X S , we want to find the minimum number of network uses n required to achieve certain decoding and leakage requirements. F.2 Let each message X s be uniformly distributed over |X s |, and define R s def = (log 2 |X s |)/n as the average message rate per network use. Given a number of network uses n, we want to find rate tuples R S that satisfy certain decoding and leakage requirements.
. . , X s m ) where each X s i are independently distributed according to p s . This means |X s | = L m s . We want to find the maximum source-channel rate m/n that satisfies certain decoding and leakage requirements. For formulations F.2 and F.3 above, one can fix the rate (R S for F.2 or m/n for F.3) and find a sequence of network codes with increasing n to get following notions of security criteria:
where ℓ = n for F.2, and ℓ = m for F.3.
B. Secure index coding 1) Secure index-coding instances:
We follow Dau, Skachek, and Chee's secure index-coding definition [7] . A secure index-coding instance, denoted by I = (Ŝ,T, {(Ŵ t ,Ĥ t ) : t ∈T },Ŵ), is defined as follows:
•Ŝ is a strictly ordered set of indices of source messages available at a sender.
•T is an strictly ordered set of receiver indices.
•Ŵ t is the set of the indices of the messages required by receiver t ∈T .
•Ĥ t is the set of indices of the messages known a priori to receiver t ∈T . 
andĉ b is then chosen to be a function of the link capacities of the equivalent network-coding instance. Our choice results in a scaling factor of the alphabet size for the index-coding messages, but avoids the issue of 2ĉ b n not being an integer.
As with network coding, let the probability of the event that one or more destination nodes make a decoding error be denoted aŝ
for at least one destination node t ∈T }.
(3) For some ǫ ∈ R + 0 , an index code (ê,D) said to have at most ǫ error if and only ifP e ≤ ǫ.
3) Randomised index codes: A randomised index code (ê ′ ,D) is defined similar to the deterministic index codes except that the sender's encoding function takes in an independent random keyẐ in addition toXŜ. Unlike the model by Mojahedian, Aref, and Gohari [17] , the randomness allowed in the encoding in our setting is generated locally at the sender, and is not shared with the receivers or the eavesdroppers. 
Also, when η = 0, we say that the index code is perfectly secure.
5) Secure index-coding feasibility:
Similar to the feasibility notion for secure network coding, a secure index-coding instance I is said to be (Ŝ * , (pX We follow the mapping for G and C by Effros et al. [3] : S =Ŝ. For each message X i , i ∈ S, the source locations are O(i) = s i , i.e., the message X i originates at vertex s i , and is destined for D(i) = {t j : i ∈Ŵ j }. Note that by construction, for each i ∈T ,
}, that means, the requested messages are the same in both instances; and
, that means, side information in I manifests itself in incoming links from corresponding source nodes in N. Also, the vertices V \ {t 1 , . . . , t ℓ } are not the destinations of any source message.
We propose the following mapping W for the eavesdroppers:
• The eavesdropping pattern W is defined as R =R, B r = {(1 → 2), {out(s i ) : i ∈B r }}, and A r =Â r , for each r ∈R. Note that different from the mapping C, we propose that the side information of an eavesdropper in I be mapped to an eavesdropper in N having access to all outgoing links from the corresponding source nodes as well as the link 1 → 2. Figure 1 depicts an example of such a mapping.
B. Equivalence results
With the above conversion, we now state an equivalence between these two instances:
Theorem 1: Let I be a secure index-coding instance, and N be the corresponding secure network-coding instance using the index-to-network coding mapping. For any ǫ, η ∈ R + 0 , and n ∈ Z + , the instance I is (Ŝ, (pX s : s ∈Ŝ), ǫ, η, n)-feasible if and only if N is (S, (p X s : s ∈ S), ǫ, η, n)-feasible with deterministic coding functions for vertices {s i : i ∈Ŝ}, wherê XŜ d = X S . The theorem above preserves the message size, as well as the decodability and security criteria. We will prove Theorem 1 in the next two sections.
(a) A secure index-coding instance I, where an eavesdropperr has access to the broadcast messageX b , side informationX 4 , and tries to reconstructX 2
(b) A secure network-coding instance N, where an eavesdropper r has access to link (1 → 2), all outgoing links from node s 4 , and tries to reconstruct X 2 . The capacity of all links given by thick arrows is 1 bit per channel use We will now prove Theorem 1 for the forward direction, that is I is (Ŝ, (pX
A. Code construction
Let (ê,D) be a secure index code (which can be randomised) for I that is (Ŝ, (pX s : s ∈Ŝ), ǫ, η, n)-feasible. We now adapt the code mapping by El Rouayheb et al. and Effros et al. to obtain a network code for N. The decoding fidelity for this code mapping has been proven for deterministic codes. Here, we will prove that this code mapping also satisfy
• the same decoding criterion for randomised index codes, and • the security criteria. The secure network code (E, D) is as follows:
• Set a deterministic edge function e s i (X O −1 (s i ) ) = e s i (X i ) = X i for all outgoing edges from each vertex in {s i : i ∈ S}. This is possible since vertex s i is the originating vertex for the message X i , and the link capacity is sufficiently large.
which is the random key used in the encoding function of vertex 1 in N) is independent of all the source messages X S and has the same distribution asẐ (which is the random key in the encoding function in I). This means
Again this is possible as vertex 1 receives X S from the incoming links, and the link (1 → 2) and all outgoing links from vertex 2 have the capacity of n bits per use.
• Set X e = e e (·) = X 1→2 for all e ∈ out(2)
for all i ∈T , and d u = 0 for all other vertices.
B. Decoding criteria
Note that, in the network-coding instance N, only receivers {t i : i ∈T } need to decode messages, and each of them receivesê(X S , Z 1 ) and XĤ i over its coming links. These are the same functions that each receiver i ∈T receives in the index-coding instance I. By using the same decoding functions for receivers {t i : i ∈T } in N, ifP e ≤ ǫ for I, we also must have P e ≤ ǫ for N.
C. Security criteria
Each eavesdropper r ∈ R in N has access to messages X B r on the link set B r consisting of 
For N, we now show that
where (6b) follows from (5b) with a change of variables (from non-hatted to hatted). This completes the security proof for N.
V. PROOF OF THEOREM 1 -THE BACKWARD DIRECTION
We will now prove Theorem 1 for the backward direction, that is,
A. Code construction
Let (E, D) be a secure network code for N that is (Ŝ, (pX s : s ∈Ŝ), ǫ, η, n)-feasible such that the outgoing links from the sources {s i : i ∈ S} are each deterministic functions of the source messages X i , i.e., for each i ∈ S, we have X e = e e (X i ), for each e ∈ out(s i ).
This means, for a given message realisation, the only randomness in the code is due to Z 1 and Z 2 , which are the independent random keys injected by nodes 1 and 2 respectively (refer to the definition of network codes). This implies that a global encoding function g 1→2 (X S , Z 1 ) can be written for the link 1 → 2. We see that as Z 2 is independent of all {X S , Z 1 }, we have the following Markov chain: (8) for each i ∈ S. Recall that g e is the global encoding function of e e . By data-processing inequality, the probability of decoding error P e cannot increase if we replace X 2→t i with X 1→2 in each receiver t i 's observations. Also, by definition, none of the links {2 → t i : i ∈T } can be accessed by any eavesdropper. Consequently, for any network code N (mapped from an index code I) that is (Ŝ, (pX
will result in another (Ŝ, (pX s : s ∈Ŝ), ǫ, η, n)-feasible network code for N. This is because doing so can only improve decodability, and will not affect security. Without loss of rate performance, for the remaining of this section, we will consider network codes only of the form (9) .
With this, we now construct the required secure index code (ê,D). The construction is the same by El Rouayheb et al. and Effros et al., except for a modification that allows the network code to be randomised, where the randomness is restricted to node 1 (manifested in Z 1 ). For this code construction, an equivalence under the decoding criterion has been proven for deterministic codes. Here, we will prove an equivalence under both decoding and security criteria for randomised codes.
The index code is chosen as follows:
• Set the decoding function of receiver i ∈T to
. This is feasible since receiver i observesê(·) =X 1→2 from the sender and has side informationXĤ i .
B. Decoding criteria
For the network-coding instance N, where each receiver t i tries to decode XŴ i from g 1→2 (X S , Z 1 ) and {e s j →t i (X j ) : j ∈ H i }, we have P e ≤ ǫ. For the index-coding instance I, since each receiver i tries to decodeXŴ
C. Security criteria
From the security condition of N, we have I(X A r ; X B r ) < η, where B r = {(1 → 2), {out(s i ) : i ∈B r }} are the indices of all outgoing links from sources nodes {s i : i ∈B r } plus the link 1 → 2, which are observed by the eavesdropper r, .
A r =Â r are the indices of the messages that eavesdropper r wants to obtain.
Showing that the index code also satisfy a similar security condition is not trivial, as the eavesdroppers in I can access the messages themselves, instead of just functions of the messages as in N. Note that these functions may not necessarily allow one to recover the messages, as we allow non-zero error decoding probability. So, it seems that the eavesdroppers in I have "better" observations, which may lead to a larger leakage in the code.
We will show that this is not the case. First, note the following: (a) {X S , Z 1 } are mutually independent; (b) X out(s i
which is equivalent to
This means that eavesdropper r, having observed the links X B r , does not gain any more information about XÂ r even if it can also observe the sources messages XB r . Now, we show that the eavesdropper cannot do better if we replace its observation of the outgoing links from the sources with the source messages:
Since we setX b = g 1→2 (XŜ,Ẑ), we have (XŜ,Ẑ, 
VI. MAPPING FROM SECURE NETWORK CODING TO SECURE INDEX CODING

A. Network-to-index coding mapping
In the other direction, consider a secure network-coding instance N = (G, C, W) .
Without loss of generality, we assume that each message is requested by at least one destination. Otherwise, it can be removed from the system without affecting decodability and security.
To map N to an index-coding instance I = (Ŝ,T, {(Ŵ t ,Ĥ t ) : t ∈T },Ŵ), we perform the following steps:
• We first construct an augmented secure network-coding instance N ′ from any (possibly randomised) secure network-coding instance N. †
• We then following the mapping by Effros et al. to obtain S,T, {(Ŵ t ,Ĥ t ) : t ∈T } from N ′ , except that we omitting one receiver inT . We will show that omitting this receiver will not affect the result.
• We will propose a mapping for the eavesdroppers to get W.
For I, we setn
This means the number of bit that the sender can transmit in I equals the total number of bits that can be transmitted on all the edges in N. Now, we describe the configuration mapping in detail: 1) Augmented secure network coding: We construct an augmented secure network-coding instance
as follows: • W ′ = W, which means R ′ = R, B ′ r = B r , and A ′ r = A r . The adversarial setting remains the same. Thus, the random keys {X ′ S+v : v ∈ [V]} are neither known to the adversaries nor required to be protected.
, any deterministic or randomised secure network code for N is equivalent to a deterministic secure network code for N ′ , where each node v is assigned an additional source X ′ S+v that is not required to be decoded by any node. Note that for vertices v ∈ [V] that has no outgoing edge, we set Z v = α.
Denote the set of vertices in N ′ that are destinations for some source messages by U ′ = { j ∈ V ′ : j ∈ D ′ (i) for some i ∈ S ′ }. Note that O ′ (·) can map different source indices to one vertex, and so O ′−1 ( j) returns a set of indices of messages originating at vertex j. † We will see later that this step is required for the code mapping.
2) Network-to-index coding mapping: Now, we map N ′ to a secure index-coding instance I.
•Ŝ = S ′ ∪ E ′ . It consists of one messageX s for each s ∈ S ′ in N ′ , and oneX e for each e ∈ E ′ in N ′ .
•T = {t i } i ∈U ′ ∪ {t e } e∈E ′ . This means I has |U ′ | + |E ′ | receivers: one corresponds to each destination node in N ′ , and one corresponds to each edge in N ′ .
• For eacht e ∈T where e ∈ E ′ , we setĤt e = in(tail(e)) ∪ O ′−1 (tail(e)), andŴt e = {e}. Briefly, receivert all hasĤt all =X S ′ and wantsŴt all =X E ′ . This additional receiver was added to guarantee the following useful property: For any broadcast messagex b ∈ [2n] and any realisationx S ′ , if we know that all receivers can decode their requested messages correctly, then there can be only one unique realisationx E ′ which has led to the broadcast messagê x b . We will show that this required property remains true even without receivert all .
Part of the result for the network-to-index coding mapping will be expressed in term of the total variation distance of probability measures. Let p and q be two pmfs on an finite discrete alphabet Ω. The total variation distance ‡ between p and q can be expressed in L 1 norms as δ(p, q) =
σ ∈Ω |p(σ) − q(σ)|. Also, denote the uniform distribution on a finite set Ω by unif(Ω).
B. Equivalence results
With the above-mentioned conversion, we now state an equivalence between N and I through N ′ : Theorem 2: Let N be a secure network-coding instance, N ′ be its augmented instance, and I be the corresponding secure index-coding instance obtained using the network-toindex coding mapping from N ′ . For any η ∈ R + 0 , ǫ ∈ [0, 0.5], and n ∈ Z + , we have the following: 1) If N, in which all messages X S are independent and uniformly distributed, is (S, (p X s : s ∈ S), ǫ, η, n)-feasible, then I is (S, (pX s : s ∈ S), ǫ, η,n)-feasible, wherê
2) If I, in which all messagesX S ′ ∪E ′ are independent and uniformly distributed, is (S, (pX s : s ∈ S), ǫ, η,n)-feasible, whereX e ∈ [2 ⌊c e n⌋ ] then a) For ǫ = 0, N is (S, (p X s : s ∈ S), ǫ, η, n)-feasible; and b) Otherwise (for 0 < ǫ ≤ 0.5), N is (S, (p X s : s ∈ S), |R|η + ζ, γ, n)-feasible, ‡ For two probability measures P and Q on a measurable space (X, Σ), the total variation distance is defined as δ(P, Q)
(a) N with randomised encoding
(c) I with deterministic encoding =X S , ζ is a function of (ǫ, n), and γ is a function of (ζ, ǫ, η, n), defined as follows:
Proof: See Sections VII and VIII. Part 1 of the above theorem is proven by setting the pmfs of the rest of the messages in I (which areXŜ \S ) as follows:
As mentioned above, we choose X ′ S ′ d = (X S , Z V ) for N ′ to get an equivalent network-coding instance. For I, we choosê
, and eachX e , e ∈ E ′ , to be uniformly distributed over [2 ⌊c ′ e n⌋ ]. We will see that using uniformly distributedX e is the key to ensuring security. Note that unlike the index-to-network mapping, hereX E ′ and X ′ E ′ have different distributions. {X i : i ∈ S ′ ∪E ′ } in I are mutually independent, while {X ′ i : i ∈ E ′ } in N ′ are functions of X ′ S ′ and may be correlated. §
In Part 2b of Theorem 2, the upper bounds on decoding error and leakage increase exponentially with n. We can tighten the bounds for linear codes:
Corollary 2.1: Let N be a secure network-coding instance and I be the corresponding secure index-coding instance obtained using the network-to-index coding mapping. For any η ∈ R + 0 , ǫ ∈ (0, 0.5], and n ∈ Z + , we have the following: If I is (S, (pX s : s ∈ S), ǫ, η,n)-feasible using a linear index code with cardinality 2n, whereX S ′ ∪E ′ are independent and uniformly distributed, then N is (S, (p X s : s ∈ S), |R|η + ǫ, γ ′ , n)-feasible, where
Note here that, for linear codes, the error probability for N is independent of n, and is solely a function of ǫ, η, and the number of eavesdroppers |R|; the leakage for N is a linear § This property is also true in the mapping of Effros et al. function of n, and the coefficient of n can be made arbitrarily small by choosing arbitrarily small η and ǫ. This means a sequence of strongly-secure index codes for I translates to a sequence of weakly-secure network codes for N (with appropriate rate scaling).
Proof of Corollary 2.1: Using linear codes for I, if the messages are uniformly distributed, then the codewordX b is uniformly distributed over its support. So, δ(pX b , unif([2 n ])) = 0, which implies ζ = ǫ, and Corollary 2.1 follows directly from Part 2b of Theorem 2.
VII. PROOF OF THEOREM 2 -PART 1 (THE FORWARD DIRECTION)
We will now prove Part 1 in Theorem 2, that is N is (S, (p X s : s ∈ S), ǫ, η, n-feasible ⇒ I is (S, (pX s : s ∈ S), ǫ, η,n)-feasible.
A. Code construction
for some Z V using deterministic network encoding functions {e ′ e } derived from {e e } for N, where all the randomness {Z v : v ∈ V} in the network code for N is realised using {X ′ S+v : v ∈ V} in N ′ . Since the network code for N ′ is deterministic, we use the same code mapping as that proposed by Effros et al. [3] : The sender broadcastsX b = [X b,e : e ∈ E ′ ], wherê
Note that eachX e , g ′ e ∈ [2 ⌊c ′ e n⌋ ] = [2 ⌊c e n⌋ ], and thereforê
B. Decoding criteria
In N, according to definition (1), with probability of at least (1 − ǫ) (over the messages p X S ), every vertex v ∈ U ′ can decode all messages that it requires from the message on all incoming edges and messages originating at v. Since, only messages X S of all messages X S ′ in N ′ need to be decoded, it follows that, in N ′ , with probability of at least (1 − ǫ), every v ∈ U ′ satisfies the following:
or equivalently,
We first consider receiverst i ∈T where i ∈ U ′ : As mentioned above, while source messages X ′ O ′−1 (v) in N ′ and
), directly porting (15) to I will not work, as the pmf (X ′ S ′ , X ′ E ′ ) and that of (X S ′,X E ′ ) =XŜ are different. To deal with this issue, consider the broadcast messageX b . From (14) , any receiver that knowŝ X e can obtain g ′ e (X S ′ ) from the broadcast messageX b , where
and can obtain [g ′ e (X S ′ )] e∈in(i)) fromX b and X in(i) using (14) . So, using (16) with a change of variables (from non-hatted to hatted), receivert i ∈T can decode the messages it requires correctly with probability of at least (1−ǫ) because
. Now, we consider receiverst e ∈T where e ∈ E ′ . Recall thatĤt e = in(tail(e)) ∪ O ′−1 (tail(e)), andŴt e = {e}. Receivert e performs the following steps:
, which equals g ′ e (X S ′ ), where e ′ e is the local encoding function of edge e in N ′ . (iii) With g ′ e (X S ′ ) and the broadcast messageX b,e , it obtains the requiredX e using (14) . So, receivert e for each e ∈ E ′ must be able to correctly decode the requiredX e without error.
Combining these two classes of receivers, we have shown that all receivers in I can correctly decode their required messages with probability of at least (1 − ǫ). 
C. Security criteria
where (17b) where {X b (e) : e Br } are independent of (XÂˆr, {X b,e : e ∈ Br }, {X e ′ : e ′ ∈Br }), because the former has been randomised by independently and uniformly distributed {X e : e Br } (which are independent of (XÂˆr,XBˆr,X S ′ ), see (14)); (17c) follows from (14); (17d) is derived becauseX b,e is a deterministic function of (X e , g ′ e (X S ′ )); (17e) follows from the Markov chain XÂˆr − {g ′ e (X S ′ ) : e ∈Br } − {X e : e ∈Br }, which can be derived from noting that {X e : e ∈ E ′ } are independent of (XÂˆr,X S ′ ); (17g) follows from a change of variables (from hatted to nonhatted); (17h) is obtained from noting that {g ′ e (X ′ S ′ ) : e ∈ B ′ r } = X ′
B ′r
Now, for N, if I(X A r ; X B r ) ≤ η, then
where (18b) follows from (17h), and (18c) follows from X S d = X S . So, the index code is (S, (pX s : s ∈ S), ǫ, η,n)-feasible.
VIII. PROOF OF THEOREM 2 -PART 2 (THE BACKWARD DIRECTION)
We will now prove Proof of Part 2 in Theorem 2, that is, when I is (S, (pX s : s ∈ S), ǫ, η,n)-feasible. Recall thatX S ′ ∪E ′ are independent and uniformly distributed. We will again use the network-code construction proposed by Effros et al. [3] .
A. Code construction
We first show some preliminary results required for decodability. Define the following:
Definition 1: Consider I. For any realisationx S ′ , let Yx S ′ denote the set of realisationsx E ′ such that if the message tuple (x S ′,x E ′ ) for anyx E ′ ∈ Yx S ′ , then all receivers can decode their required messages correctly.
This means for any (x S ′,x E ′ ) such thatx E ′ ∈ Yx S ′ , we havê
and receivert e , for each e ∈ E ′ , In the secure index-coding instance I, messagesX E ′ are independent of messagesX S ′ , and the broadcast messageX b is a function of these messagesê(XŜ), which is computed by the sender.
We would like to use the decoding functions (19a) and (20a) for the network-coding equivalence N ′ . But, in N ′ , there is no centralised node to calculateX b . To deal with this problem, it is proposed [3] that the value ofx b in these functions be fixed to some constant σ ∈ [2n]. In other words, in contrast to I whereX b varies withX S ′ , we fix this value for N ′ . Then, we set the local encoding function of each edge e ∈ E ′ to be
and the decoding function of each destination node i ∈ U ′ to be
).
The idea is that for each edge e ∈ E ′ in N ′ , its tail node tail(e) can generate the correct outgoing edge messages x ′ e from the incoming messages x ′ in(tail(e))
, the source messages
originating from the node, and the chosen σ via (20a) (or equivalently, (21)), and consequently, all destination nodes can recover their required messages via (19a) (or equivalently, (22)). For a chosen σ, define a function φ σ (·) to be the collection of global edge encoding functions (21), that is,
The challenge here is to select a suitable σ for N ′ . A suitable σ exists to guarantee decodability [3] . In this paper, we need to further show that a suitable σ exists to guarantee both decodability and security.
B. Some decodability properties
We start with the following proposition: Proposition 1: For any choice of σ ∈ [2n] and any realisation ofx S ′ , there is at most onex E ′ ∈ Yx S ′ for whicĥ e(xŜ) =ê(x S ′,x E ′ ) = σ.
Effros et al. [3, Claim 1] have proven this for a slightly different network-to-index instance mapping, where there is an additional receiver for the index-coding equivalence called t all that hasX S ′ and wantsX E ′ . Their proof relies mainly on the existence of the additional receiver. We will prove Proposition 1 without this additional receiver.
Proof of Proposition 1: Pick any realisationx S ′ ofX S ′ . Suppose to the contradiction that there exists two distinct
E ′ ∈ Yx S ′ . Now, as I is constructed from an acyclic network-coding instance N ′ , it follows that given a deterministic index code (ê,D) (wherê D = {d t : t ∈T })), the messagesx S ′ , and the broadcast message σ, we can completely determine the messagesx E ′ . To see this, start from a vertex i with in-degree zero in N ′ , all receiverst e in I where e ∈ out(i) must decodex e solely fromx O ′−1 (i) and σ. By starting from all vertices with zero indegree (also known as root or source vertices) and traversing the edges e ∈ E ′ in the graph of N ′ , we can identify all corresponding receivert e in I, who must decodex e solely from the broadcast message σ, part of {x i : i ∈ S ′ }, and part of {x e : e ∈ E ′ } that we have obtained from previous steps. Now, since the messagesx E ′ is a deterministic function of (D,x S ′, σ), some receivert e , e ∈ E ′ must decode its required messagex e wrongly in either one of the two realisations of X E ′ , namely,x E ′ andx ′ E ′ . This contradictions the definition of Yx S ′ .
Next, we state a proposition due to Effros et al.
Note that due our use of a slightly different mapping (13), the above lemma does not require the assumption that all {2 c e n : e ∈ E ′ } being integers, an assumption that resulted in some slight mismatch in rates [3, p. 2484] .
C. Some security properties
Since I is (S, (pX s : s ∈ S), ǫ, η,n)-feasible, we have
It turns out that there may not exist a suitable σ that gives both matching error and leakage criteria in N' in general. Nonetheless, we are able to prove its existence when ǫ = 0 (i.e., perfect decodability). Otherwise when ǫ > 0, we prove a weaker form of equivalence where the error probability and the leakage of N ′ do not exactly match those for I. Now, we select any σ ∈ [2n]. For everyx S ′ , we can find exactly onex E ′ ∈ Yx S ′ = X S ′ for whichê(x S ′,x E ′ ) = σ. So, for N ′ , by selecting any σ ∈ [2n] in (21) and (22), decoding in N ′ will succeed, giving P e = 0.
D. Proof of Part 2a in
2) Security criteria: Since (X S ′,X E ′ ) are independent and uniformly distributed, pX S ′,X E ′ (x S ′,x E ′ ) = 1/(|X S ′ ||X E ′ |) and pX S ′ (x S ′ ) = 1/|X S ′ |, for allx S ′ andx E ′ . As there is a bijective map betweenx E ′ andx b given anyx S ′ , we have the following for everyx S ′ andx b :
and
where 1(E) is the indicator function, which returns 1 is E is true, and 0 otherwise, and (25b) is obtained as there is exactly onex E ′ for whichê(
for allx S ′ andx b . For N ′ , by choosing any σ in (21) and (22)), we have X ′ E ′ = φ σ (X ′ S ′ ), and thus giving
and thus
where ( 
where (a) follows from (28d).
So, if ǫ = 0, then that I is (S, (pX
E. Proof of Part 2b in Theorem 2: ǫ > 0
Issues:
Unfortunately, the results for the perfect-decoding case does not extend straightforwardly to the case of imperfect decoding due to the following reasons:
1) When ǫ = 0, choosing any σ for N ′ guarantees perfect decoding for N ′ , and we only need to select a good σ to guarantee the security criterion. However, when ǫ > 0, we need to choose a good σ that simultaneously guarantees the decodability and the security criteria. 2) When ǫ > 0, the random variables in the two instances I and N ′ do not necessarily have the same distribution as in (28d). This is because if some message realisation results in decoding error, then |Yx S ′ | < 2n for somex S ′ . This means for thisx S ′ , there could be multiple distinct x
E ′ ∈ X S ′ ,x
E ′ , for whichê(x S ′,x
E ′ ) = e(x S ′,x (2) E ′ ). This leads to the following: a) As there may not be a bijective map betweenx E ′ and x b for thisx S ′ , (24a) may not be true. b) (25b) may not hold. c) (27) may not hold. As a results, we cannot guarantee (29.a).
Our proposed solution:
We will resolve the above issues through the following steps: S.1 Relate security expressions for N ′ to that for I. S.2 Express security in I in terms of expressions obtained in S.1 averaged overX b . S.3 Relate the decoding criterion in N ′ to that in I. S.4 Express decodability in I as an average overX b using S.3. S.5 Combine the results from steps S.2 and S.4 to find a σ =x b that is simultaneously good for security and decodability.
We now present the steps in detail: 1) S.1: Relate security expressions for N ′ to that for I: Note that the edge messages X ′ E ′ in N ′ are generated by choosing a specific σ for the network code (21)-(22), which are the decoding function in I. So, if decoding in I is correct andx b =ê(x S ′,x E ′ ) = σ, then choosing σ for N ′ , we have x
For this reason, we define the following for I:
This means
for all a where pX
which is similar to (27) for the perfect-decoding case. Now, in order to restrict the leakage I(X ′ To this end, we define the following: Definition 2:
G σ is the set of all message realisationsx S ′ that result in both (i) correct decoding in I (meaning thatd = 1) and (ii)
We will bound ǫ ′ later.
Step 1 is complete with the following lemma: 
Substituting (36b) into (23c), we have
for each eavesdropper r ∈ R. Summing it for all eavesdroppers and swapping the summation order, we get
We will use this and Lemma 1 to bound the leakage in N ′ in step S.5. As we need to consider both decoding and security simultaneously, we will now consider the probability of decoding error.
3) S.3: Relate the decoding criterion in N ′ to that in I: We first define some terminology:
In I, we say that a realisation (X S ′,X E ′ ) is I-good if and only if each receiver in I can decode its required messages correctly. By definition, there are at least (1 − ǫ)|X S ′ ||X E ′ | = (1 − ǫ)|X S ′ |2n good realisations. We say that a message realisation is I-bad if and only if it is not I-good. Now, consider N ′ using the network code defined in (21) and (22). We say that a realisation of messages X ′ S ′ is N ′ -good if and only if every receiver in N ′ can decode its required messages correctly. By code construction, if (x S ′,x E ′ ) is Igood for I, then x ′ S ′ =x S ′ is N ′ -good for N ′ using σ = e(x S ′,x E ′ ) for the network code.
For a specific σ ∈ [2n], the set of I-good realisations are defined as follows:
Definition 3:
Summing over all σ ∈ [2n], the total number of I-good realisations in I is σ ∈[2n ] |Z σ | ≥ (1 − ǫ)|X S ′ |2n, and the total number of I-bad realisations must be 2n|X
Next, note that for any chosen σ ∈ [2n], invoking Proposition 1, we have |G σ | = |Z σ |. So,
Also, note that by choosing σ for the network code, at least |G σ | realisations of X ′ S ′ in N ′ that are N ′ -good. Since the messages are X ′ S ′ uniformly generated, the probability of decoding error in N ′ when σ is chosen is
4) S.4: Express decodability in I as an average overX b using S.3.: For decodability, we would choose a σ that is has a low | G c σ | |X S ′ | , which we can then use to upper bound P e,σ . The difficulty in choosing a suitable σ is caused by the different ways in which the leakage and the error probability in I are related to σ. See (38b) where η is related to pX b (σ), and (41d) where ǫ is related to the uniform distribution.
To circumvent this, we will now consider three ways of relating pX b to ǫ:
|X S ′ | ≤ |R|η + ζ for the chosen σ. By substituting Lemma 1 into (55), we have the following security constraint for N ′ :
+ (|R|η + ζ) log |X S ′ | − log(1 − (|R|η + ζ))
(log e +n)) (56a) = (|R|η + ζ) 1 1 − ǫ + log e +n 1 − (|R|η + ζ) + log |X S ′ | ≤ ǫ ′ log |X S ′ | − log(1 − ǫ ′ ) + ǫ ′ 1 − ǫ ′ (log e +n)).
In the following, we omit the subscript of probability mass functions. The reader can easily infer the subscript from the argument.
A. Proof of Proposition 3
Recall that the messages (X S ′,X E ′ ) for I and X ′ S ′ for N ′ are both uniformly distributed. From Proposition 1, if decoding is successful, that is,d = 1, we know that for eachx S ′ ∈ G σ , there is only one uniquex E ′ for whichê(x S ′,x E ′ ) = σ. This implies 
Note that when decoding is correct,x E ′ = φ σ (x S ′ ) is a deterministic function ofx S ′ and σ. So, p(xB r |1, σ) = 
B. Proof of Proposition 4
Define the following: 
